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1Preface
The National Network of Grantmakers (NNG) is pleased to publish Perry Mehrling’s cogent 
report on foundation grants payout, a topic of great importance to the field of philan-
thropy. We commissioned Professor Mehrling, Chair of the Barnard College Economics 
Department and a member of the Columbia University faculty, to undertake this economic 
study as a non-biased expert. Mehrling’s research is primarily a trends analysis of assets and 
grants since 1975. His findings also offer a broader perspective on foundation growth — 
including investments, gifts, and new formations — painting a picture of the grantmaking 
world that is not as endowment-driven as is widely believed. 
NNG has revived a debate concerning “payout,” urging our colleagues to pay out more in 
grants that address today’s pressing problems. After 30 years of legislatively mandated pay-
out, it is clear that too many private foundations have adopted the minimum payout rate 
of 5% of assets as a de facto maximum, even during times of significant asset expansion. At 
NNG, we can only conclude that a huge and mostly invisible element of the philanthropic 
field is more concerned with investment banking than grantmaking. We are working to shift 
the focus of the payout debate from building assets and avoiding tax penalties, to increasing 
the amount of grants to communities in greatest need.
NNG’s concern has been with how a majority of philanthropy frames the payout debate. 
With certain notable exceptions, the foundation community’s focus is on investment 
returns, market fluctuations, and maximizing wealth, losing sight of why they and the pay-
out debate exist – the grantees. Grants are the primary way philanthropy impacts our soci-
ety. Grants fund the people and organizations at the heart of building communities, allevi-
ating poverty and creating change.
We initially asked Professor Mehrling to review the report of DeMarche Associates (1995), 
examine their assumptions, and run his own simulations. He found the DeMarche approach 
to be flawed. In addition to treating the hypothetical single foundation as the subject of 
analysis, DeMarche and others (Salamon and Voytek 1989, Salamon 1991,) ignore the pos-
sibility that the value and consequence of current grantmaking in solving urgent problems 
may well be higher now than in the future (Frumkin 1998). Mehrling’s research is largely 
based on actual foundation grants payout and growth using the Foundation Center’s data. 
The subject of payout is controversial and methodologically challenging, and even the word 
payout is open to various interpretations. For example, the tax code uses the legal lan-
guage “distribution requirement” and “qualifying distributions,” which also include foun-
dations’ administrative expenses, program related investments, and trustee fees, in addi-
tion to grants. While some discussions of payout are in the context of the legally mandated 
distribution requirement, this report centers specifically on grants payout, or grants given 
out as a percentage of assets. Mehrling’s focus is not the extent to which foundations can 
minimize their current charitable distributions to avoid being penalized.
Any study of payout trends needs to address the contested definition of payout and the 
quality of available data. There is simply no set formula for calculating the payout rates 
of private and other foundations. The IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) division in their SOI 
Bulletin looks at qualifying distributions as a percentage of investment assets from the same 
year, but also includes accumulated “carry-over”(or past distributions in excess of 5%) in 
their formula. The Council on Foundations’ Foundation Management Series, Ninth Edition 
(1998) model the SOI calculation, adding “total taxes paid.” Salamon and Voytek (1989) and 
Salamon (1991) also look at “qualifying distributions” as a percentage of “investment assets” 
for the same year, but do not add in carry-over or total taxes paid. Instead they argue that 
payout should be computed on a multi-year basis. Complicating variables include the excise 
tax and the window of time allowed to meet the distribution requirement.
In fact, the Foundation Center’s (FC) published data do not include all the variables need-
ed for calculating legal distribution requirements. However, the FC does provide pub-
lished aggregate data on foundation assets, grants and gifts since the 1970s. Without sifting 
through the hundreds of thousands of 990-PFs filed over the past three decades, this was the 
most readily accessible data, however limited. Published FC data are not disaggregated by 
foundation type and size for the full period under consideration. We do know from other 
studies, however, that a generally higher rate of giving by smaller and mid-sized foundations 
has compensated for the payout rates of the largest funders (Salamon and Voytek 1989, 
Salamon 1991, Arnsberger 1998-9).
For more than two decades, NNG has promoted strategic funding for social change. Social 
change giving is about reaching those that traditional charities often ignore, but who are 
in the greatest need of help — low-income women and children, the elderly, those with 
disabilities, and the poor in general. A premise of social change funding is that the dis-
enfranchised, including people of color, lesbians and gays, can solve their own problems 
if they have the power and opportunity to do so. NNG works primarily within organized 
philanthropy to increase financial and other resources to groups committed to our vision.
Since 1997, NNG has focused more sharply on “moving” more philanthropic dollars to 
the causes that help make our world better, fairer, safer, more just and more sustainable 
for all people. Our survey of social change giving in the United States found that just 
2.4% of all grantmaking addressed disadvantaged, disenfranchised communities in need. 
Furthermore, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports that the U.S. now has the 
widest gap between rich and poor of any industrialized country in the world. If we are to see 
an increase in funding to those who are helping to change these circumstances, foundation 
grants payout is a logical place to begin.
This year, NNG instituted a new initiative “1% More for Democracy.” We are asking our 
members to commit to increase their institution’s payout rate – in grants only — by at 
least 1% over the legally mandated 5%. We call upon our colleagues in the philanthropic 
community to join this effort by increasing their payout rate to include “1% More for 
Democracy” to support social and economic change. The findings of this report clearly jus-







Payout by private foundations and public charities is the source of funds 
from which flow the grants that support much of the nonprofit activity in 
our society. Other things equal, higher payout means higher grants, and 
higher grants mean more nonprofit activity.
Under current IRS rules, private foundations are required to distribute 
yearly a minimum of 5% of their net investment assets as payout. Payout 
is not limited to a foundation’s grantmaking; it may include administra-
tive expenses, program-related investments, amounts set aside for future 
charitable projects, and trustees fees.
The concept of a legally-mandated payout was instituted by Congress in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Initially, foundations had to pay whichever was 
greater — either all their investment return, or 6% of net investment assets. 
Revisions made to the IRS rules in 1981 set the minimum payout rate at 
5% of net assets, where it has remained ever since. The context for the 1981 
rule change was the previous decade during which payout had exceeded 
asset returns, with a resulting erosion of foundation endowments.
In the nearly two decades since then, asset returns have generally exceeded 
the minimum payout level, and a record amount of new giving to phil-
anthropic institutions has completely altered the payout context. While 
Congress has not yet revisited the issue of whether 5% may now be too 
low, we can be sure that it will eventually. What would be the economic 
rationale for such a shift in policy?
N  Congress Has Achieved Its Goal: The 1981 regulations that relaxed 
the minimum payout rate to 5% were intended to help private founda-
tions rebuild their endowments, or corpus. Total foundation assets have 
grown in real terms by almost three times since then. Rebuilding has 
long since been completed.
N  Grants Payout at Lowest Rate in 20 Years: During that same period 
of growth and rebuilding, foundation grants payout declined from 8% 
in 1981 to below 5% in 1997. Many foundations clearly have adopted 
the legally mandated 5% minimum payout rate as a de facto maximum 
rate.
N  The Rate of Gifts Received Has Created a New Dynamic in 
Philanthropy: Contrary to expectations in 1981, the goal of increasing 
foundation assets and grantmaking capacity in line with economic 
growth has been met almost entirely by new foundation creation and 
gifts into existing foundations (84.5% of the increase), not by reinvest-
ment of earnings on existing assets. This historical pattern looks likely to 
continue in the foreseeable future. A forthcoming report from the Boston 
College Social Welfare Research Institute estimates that intergenerational 
wealth transfer over the next 50 years will be substantially larger than 
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the previously estimated $10.4 trillion, providing an enormous source of 
new wealth for philanthropic institutions and nonprofits.
N  Foundations Could Give Out More and Maintain Corpus: 
Proponents of the payout status quo often cite findings of a study con-
ducted in 1990 by DeMarche Associates, CFA, and updated in 1995 by 
Carter Harrison, Jr., CFA, which concluded in favor of maintaining the 
5% payout rate. Applying DeMarche/Harrison’s methodology to the 20 
year period 1974-1995, Table 3 shows that a typical foundation could 
have afforded a grants payout rate as high as 8% without reducing its 
corpus. This study refutes the methodology of the DeMarche study, 
however, and looks at foundation assets for the larger purpose of social 
policy rather than wealth maximization.
N  It is Time for a Change: While clearly intending to help foundations 
with the 1981 payout regulations, Congress also required a minimum 
payout rate to prevent tax-advantaged foundations from becoming ster-
ile warehouses of wealth. Unfortunately, that is exactly what has hap-
pened, due to the extraordinary investment returns and rates of new giv-
ing into new and existing foundations, combined with declining grants 
payout rates. The legislated 5% minimum payout rate has served to sup-
press grants payout at a time of growing need in our society.
The conclusion is compelling: a minimum payout rate of 5% may have 
been right for 1981, but it is too low for today. 
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Spending Policies for Foundations
After 1981, when Congress relaxed payout1 requirements to a minimum 
5% of net investment assets, the ratio of grants payout to assets for the 
universe of foundations fell precipitously from about 8% in 1981 to about 
6% by the end of the decade (see Figure 1). In recent years, the ratio has 
declined further, falling below 5% in 1997. Such a low grants payout ratio 
may still meet the letter of the law because grants are not the only “qualify-
ing distribution” that meets the legal requirement, and because founda-
tions are allowed to average over five years. The question is whether such a 
low grants payout ratio is economically sensible in 1999.











Source: Foundation Center, Foundation Giving, 1998, Tables 9 and 10; “Highlights of the 
Foundation Center’s Foundation Giving, 1999 Edition”. The Foundation Center provides 
published aggregate data on all private foundations back to 1975. Data on independent 
foundations is taken from Foundation Giving, 1991-1999 editions.
The aggregate figures on grants payout are subject to the criticism that 
the universe of foundations is not a homogeneous group. Independent 
foundations account for the overwhelming majority of total foundation 
assets and grants. Although this group includes both large and small foun-
dations with rather different payout practices, it is homogeneous in the 
sense that it is the most prominent group to which the 5% minimum pay-
out requirement applies. Of more concern are the corporate, community, 
and operating foundations which together account for about 15% of assets 
5
1. The term ‘payout’ includes all qualifying distributions—grants, administrative expenses 
such as rent and salaries, program related investments, amounts set aside for future 
charitable projects, and trustee fees. The term ‘grants payout’ includes only grants and 
excludes all other qualifying distributions. The analysis that follows is mainly concerned 
with the ratio of grants to assets, which is the significant figure from an economic point 
of view. This economic payout ratio concept should not be confused with the legal payout 
ratio concept, which involves total qualifying distributions divided by average assets over 
the previous five year period.
6and 25% of grants. Does inclusion of these different groups in the aggregate 
numbers account for the aggregate trend? It is not possible to say for certain, 
because disaggregated data is available from the Foundation Center only 
since 1989, but the available data show that grants payout for independent 
foundations tracks the aggregate numbers fairly closely (see Figure 1). 
TA B L E  1
Disaggregation Analysis
Grants Payout Trends, 1989-1997
                                Independent  Corporate   Community  Operating Total
1989 Assets (%)                 85.8         4.2             4.4           5.7 100
1997 Assets (%)                 85.7         3.3             6.0           5.1 100
1989 Grants (%)                 75.7       17.3             5.4           1.6 100
1997 Grants (%)                 77.4       13.0             7.5           2.2 100
1989 Grants/Assets (%)      5.08       23.9             7.1           1.6 5.75
1997 Grants/Assets (%)      4.38       19.0             6.1           2.1 4.85
Source: Foundation Center, Foundation Giving, 1991-1999 editions.
Table 1 allows us to assess the potential bias involved in an aggregative 
analysis. It is clear that inclusion of corporate and community foundations 
tends to raise the aggregate grants payout ratio, because these subcategories 
have higher grants payout than the independent foundations. Balancing 
this effect somewhat, inclusion of operating foundations tends to lower the 
aggregate grants payout ratio. Another concern is that changes over time in 
the relative size of the different categories, as well as changes over time in 
the grants payout ratio within each category, may affect aggregate trends. 
In this respect, inclusion of corporate foundations tends to exacerbate the 
measured decline in grants payout, since corporate foundations were rela-
tively larger and had higher grants payout in 1989 than in 1997. Balancing 
this effect somewhat, inclusion of the community and operating founda-
tions tends to reduce the measured decline in grants payout. The overall 
effect can be assessed by comparing the aggregate decline from 5.75% to 
4.85% with the decline for independent foundations only from 5.08% to 
4.38%. Disaggregation changes absolute magnitudes somewhat but it does 
not change the overall trend.
Foundation Growth 
Since 1981, foundation assets and grants have grown strongly, both in abso-
lute terms and relative to relevant benchmarks. Figure 2 charts that growth 
by following the ratio of total foundation assets to financial assets of house-
holds and nonprofit organizations, and the ratio of total grants to gross 
domestic product. Note that the two series are plotted on different vertical 
scales. Both series show steady growth since 1981, accelerating somewhat 
since 1995. Both grants and assets have increased, but assets have increased 
faster, which accounts for the falling ratio of grants payout to assets. 















Source: Foundation Center, Foundation Giving, 1998, Tables 9 and 10; “Highlights of 
the Foundation Center’s Foundation Giving, 1999 Edition”. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, Table B.100 “Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations”. 
Economic Report of the President 1999, Table B-1 “Gross domestic product, 1959-98”.
It is helpful to put these numbers in longer historical perspective. Nelson 
(1987, Table 5-2, p. 130) reports comparable figures for the more limited 
universe of private foundations between 1962 and 1981. Over that period, 
relative assets fell from 1.16% to .86%, and relative grants from .107% to 
.087%.2 Over the same period, the ratio of grants to assets rose from 4.8% 
to 6.1% (Table 5-1, p. 129). This is the context that Congress had in mind 
in 1981 when it reduced required payout to 5%, a context that is almost 
exactly opposite the current one.
It is tempting to read the record of the last two decades as a vindication 
of the lowered payout ratio, but a closer look at the source of asset growth 
makes clear that the lowered payout ratio had very little to do with it. Table 
2 shows that almost all of the increase in foundation assets has come from 
new gifts into new and existing foundations, and very little from returns 
on existing assets in excess of payout. (See footnote 3 for details about how 
the calculation was done.) New gifts accounted for 84.5% of the increase, 
while net increase of existing assets accounted for only 15.5%. Put another 
way, of the 5.81% average annual real asset growth over this period, fully 
4.36% was accounted for by new gifts received, and only 1.38% by increase 
of existing assets.3 
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2. Nelson compares grants to gross national product, rather than gross domestic product.
3. Following Nelson, “internal growth” from investment return in excess of payout is 
calculated by first stripping out from 1996 assets all the new gifts over the entire period 
(50.98 billion), leaving 40.77 billion as an estimate of what 1996 assets would have been 
without any new gifts at all. (This is probably an overestimate, since the new gifts also 
compounded during the period.) The no-gift 1996 asset estimate is then compared with 
the initial 1977 assets (31.4 billion) to calculate the rate of compound growth, which 
is 1.38% annually. (This is probably also an overestimate.) “External growth” is then 
calculated as the additional asset growth from new gifts that is required to add up to the 
Continues
TA B L E  2  
Investment and Gifts
Foundation Growth Rate Components
Total Foundations, 1977-1996
Constant 1975 Dollars, in billions
1996 assets including those received in 1978-1996 91.75
New gifts received in 1978-1996 50.98
1996 assets excluding those received in 1978-1996 40.77
Increase of 1977 assets net of payout 9.37 
1977 assets 31.4
Annual asset growth, 1977-1996
Total growth 5.81%
Gifts and new foundation formation 4.36%
Investment return net of payout 1.38%
Source: Foundation Giving, 1998. The Foundation Center’s figures for gifts received begin 
only in 1978. Figures for gifts received in 1986 were not available, which biases the figures 
toward an underestimate of the importance of new gifts received.
Congress intended that the 5% minimum payout requirement would give 
foundations the opportunity to rebuild and foundations did so at the rate 
of 1.38% annually. What Congress did not anticipate was that new gifts 
would be so strong as to swamp the contribution of internal return. Two 
decades later, it is clear that foundation assets would have grown strongly 
even if payout had been 1% higher, and this historical pattern appears 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
Perpetuity and Payout: 
The individual foundation
Recognizing that there is no longer a case for keeping payout low in order 
to rebuild foundation assets, those who favor limiting payout to 5% focus 
instead on maintaining existing assets whole in the face of uncertain future 
asset returns. The most prominent such analysis is that of DeMarche 
Associates (1995). Their analysis differs from the preceding by its focus on 
the experience of a hypothetical single foundation with a typical asset mix 
of stocks and bonds instead of on the actual experience of the entire uni-
verse of foundations. For the sake of comparison, Table 3 shows the results 
of their alternative methodology when applied to the last twenty years.4 If 
anything, the results are even more supportive of the conclusion that there 
is room for increased payout. Even an 8% charitable payout (which is 8.5% 
8
3. (continued from page 7) actual total compound growth of 5.81%, so 
1.0138x1.0436=1.0581. Because this calculation tends to overestimate the contribution of 
internal investment return, it also tends to underestimate the contribution of new gifts.
It should be noted that, although the calculation methodology is identical to Nelson’s, 
the data to which it is applied here is somewhat different. He studied the growth of a 
fixed panel of foundations, while the present analysis is concerned with the growth of the 
foundation sector as a whole.
9total payout allowing .5% for investment expenses) would have maintained 
the real asset value of the hypothetical foundation’s endowment. Note also 
that total charitable payout over the twenty year period would have been 
higher with 8% payout than with 5%.5
TA B L E  3
Summary Analysis of Different
Charitable Payout Scenarios, 1975-1994
(in thousands of dollars)
Charitable Payout 
                                                               5.0%          6.0%         7.0% 8.0%
1975 Asset Value                                    1000           1000          1000 1000
1994 Nominal Asset Value                      5058           4510          3778 3160
1994 Real Asset Value                             1750           1453          1204 996
Average Asset Growth Rate                     2.8%          1.9%           .9% 0%
1975 Charitable Payout                               50               60              70 80
1994 Charitable Payout                             269             271            264 253
1975-1994 Total Payout                         2866           3082          3226 3314
Source: DeMarche Associates (1995, Tables 3-5) and author’s calculations. All calculations 
include .5% investment management expense in addition to charitable payout.
It should be noted that the figures in Table 3 depend on the time period, 
which was chosen to match as closely as possible the time period for which 
the aggregative Foundation Center data is available. DeMarche Associates 
conduct their analysis for the longer period 1950-1994, and find that 5.0% 
payout results in asset growth of 25.4% over the whole period, which is 
about .5% annually, so their analysis supports a payout increase of .5%. 
Craig (1999) conducts a similar analysis for the period 1900-1999, and 
finds that 5% payout results in asset growth of 0% (after subtracting .7% 
for investment expenses). Since there is no particular reason to think that 
the distant past provides better information about the future than does the 
recent past, there is no particular reason to prefer their figures over those 
in Table 3. The plain fact of the matter is that we don’t know what future 
asset returns are going to be.
What is the right policy for a foundation facing uncertain future asset 
returns? Modern finance teaches us that the right policy for an individual 
wealth holder depends on her degree of risk aversion. The DeMarche and 
Craig analyses both draw an analogy between the individual wealth holder 
and the individual foundation. That analogy is arguably strained, however, 
since it is questionable whether the foundation is or should be a risk averse 
4. To ensure comparability, investment returns were taken from DeMarche Associates (1995, 
Tables 3-5) which explains why the most recent year is 1994. In order to retain a twenty year 
time span, the start date was pushed back to 1975. Because of the different time spans, Tables 
2 and 3 are not strictly comparable.
5. Figures for total charitable payout are provided for the sake of comparability with DeMarche 
Associates, Table E-1. From an economic point of view, however, it is not legitimate to add 
payouts in different years without discounting later years by the time value of money.
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wealth maximizer. A better analogy is that between a profit-maximizing 
firm and the foundation. 
A foundation is like a firm that mobilizes its assets in order to maximize 
profit, but with profit conceived more broadly. An ordinary firm makes an 
investment when the expected benefit is greater than the expected cost and, 
since both these numbers are naturally expressed in monetary units, the 
required comparison is relatively easy and the decision is straightforward, 
at least in principle. For a foundation, things are not so easy because the 
relevant benefits and costs are not always naturally expressed in monetary 
units, nor can monetary values always be easily deduced. Nevertheless, the 
principle is clear. Just like a firm, the goal of a foundation should be to 
make a “difference” (or some other analogue to the private firm’s “profit”), 
not to perpetuate itself as an entity. 
In the world of firms and profit, there are checks that prevent firms from 
losing sight of their legitimate goals, checks such as takeovers and bank-
ruptcies. The only analogous check in the world of foundations is the 5% 
minimum payout which, as we have seen, is a rather weak check. The analo-
ogy with profit-maximizing firms suggests that payout rates should be high 
enough that foundations are required to attract new funds in order to pur-
sue their missions. Foundations that do not want to become sterile ware-
houses of wealth should adopt higher payout rates voluntarily. 
From this point of view, the methodology employed by DeMarche/Harrison 
and applied in Table 3 is irrelevant, since perpetuity in itself is no legiti-
mate goal of a charitable foundation, nor are the conservative spending 
and investment policies that follow from adoption of such a goal. As used 
in this study, Table 3 can be seen as a bridge between the narrow, individual 
approach used in DeMarche/Harrison and the broader social approach 
adopted below.
Perpetuity and Payout: The foundation sector
Behind much of current debate about payout rates one senses a concern 
not just to ensure that grantmaking capacity doesn’t shrink but even more 
to ensure that grantmaking capacity grows at least at the rate of growth of 
the economy, if not faster. However compelling are today’s social problems, 
tomorrow’s are likely to be just as compelling, and also likely more expensive 
given the increasing scale of economic activity. From the point of view of 
an individual foundation with a fixed endowment, it appears that the only 
thing it can do to prepare for the future is to set aside some of today’s invest-
ment return, which means keeping total payout below return. This is the 
point of view that lies behind much of the resistance to higher payout rates.
From a larger point of view, however, growth of grantmaking capacity 
depends very little on reinvestment of returns from existing assets, and 
much more on new giving to existing foundations and on new giving to 
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form new foundations. The historical facts on this matter (see Table 2) are 
incontrovertible. From the point of view of society as a whole, it is not 
the asset growth of any individual foundation that matters, but rather the 
asset growth of the entire collection of foundations. From a social point 
of view, the collection of foundations appears as one large unified founda-
tion whose assets have grown at 5.81% annually over the last twenty years, 
which is significantly faster than the rate of growth of the economy.
From a social point of view, even the asset growth of the entire collection of 
foundations underestimates aggregate grantmaking capacity. What matters 
is the growth of the total quantity of assets devoted to charitable purposes 
and the income generated by those assets, whether or not those assets cur-
rently reside in a foundation endowment and whether or not that income 
is channeled through a recognized foundation entity. Classification as a 
charitable foundation is a tax status, and nothing more. If tax law were 
changed to favor segregation of charitable assets into legal entities called 
foundations, then foundation assets would grow, but that doesn’t mean 
that charitable assets would grow. 
To make the point completely clear, it will help to have in mind the dif-
ference between two idealized charitable giving systems, an endowment 
system and a non-endowment system. In an endowment system, founda-
tions own all charitable assets, and all grants are funded from the income 
on those assets. In a non-endowment system, foundations hold no assets 
and all grants are funded by new giving that flows into foundations from 
the income generated by charitable assets held elsewhere. Note that in a 
non-endowment system, it makes no sense to calculate a payout ratio for 
an individual foundation, since foundation assets in the denominator of 
such a ratio are zero. Note further that, though the two systems look very 
different, total grants will be the same so long as total charitable assets are 
the same in each system.
Which of these systems best describes the U.S. charitable giving system? 
The attention paid to payout ratios suggests that people think of the U.S. 
system as an endowment system, but is it? Not when you take an aggrega-
tive point of view. Figure 3 shows that over the last two decades new foun-
dation creation and gifts into existing foundations has been approximately 
the same order of magnitude as total foundation grants. Summing over the 
period 1978-1996, new gifts received was 50.98 billion (in constant 1975 
dollars) while total grants were 57.64 billion. This is the pattern one would 
expect to observe in a non-endowment system in which all gifts received 
are spent on current grants. Figure 3 shows that, in effect, the entire foun-
dation sector has been behaving as though it were a non-endowment pass-
through foundation, spending current giving and leaving existing assets 
almost untouched. 
To the extent that the U.S. charitable system is a non-endowment system, 
it makes no sense to limit total payout to only 5% of whatever assets hap-
pen to be on foundation balance sheets at a moment in time. Furthermore, 
and also to the extent that the U.S. charitable system is a non-endowment 
system, measured payout ratios are much less relevant to the question of 
perpetuity than is commonly realized.
F I G U R E  3














Source: Foundation Center, Foundation Giving, 1998, Tables 9 and 10.
Conclusion
No one says that individual non-endowment foundations (for example, 
most corporate foundations), which necessarily have very high payout 
ratios, are by virtue of their high payout endangering the perpetuation of 
their charitable mission. The reason no one says this is that it is apparent 
that there are perfectly adequate assets generating the payout. They just 
happen to be on the balance sheet of the foundations’ sponsors, not of the 
foundations themselves. By analogy, to the extent that the U.S. foundation 
sector operates as if it were a non-endowment system, the measured payout 
ratio has very little to do with the issue of perpetuation of the charitable 
mission of the foundation sector as a whole. 
The impetus for the current discussion about increasing payout (see 
Odendahl 1999 and Craig 1999) is, no doubt, the strength of recent asset 
returns. From an economic point of view, the true importance of recent 
asset returns is that they have swelled the volume of charitable assets held 
outside current foundation management. It is these assets, not the invest-
ment return net of payout on existing foundation assets, on which per-
petuation of the charitable mission of the foundation sector depends.
Finally, it needs to be remembered that the 5% minimum payout require-
ment imposed by Congress is there not to keep foundations from paying 
out too much but to keep them from paying out too little. Putting the point 
more sharply, Congress intended to keep tax-favored foundations from 
becoming mere warehouses of wealth. To the extent that the foundation 
sector operates as if though it were a non-endowment system, paying out 
new giving while allowing existing assets to compound in perpetuity, the 
foundation sector is in danger of appearing to be exactly what Congress 
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wanted to prevent (and probably still wants to prevent). To the extent 
that individual foundations reduce payout to the legal minimum simply in 
order to increase their assets under management, they defeat the real social 
purpose of their privileged tax status and risk attracting renewed legislative 
attention.
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